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Comments
THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES DEEP SEABED
MINING: STILL IN THE HANDS
OF CONGRESS
This Comment analyzes the present dilemma of the United
States ocean mining industry. The Comment reviews the detri-
mental effects of a forthcoming Law of the Sea treaty on the
ocean mininig industry and discusses the inadequacy of the pro-
tection offered by Congress against these effects. The Comment
stresses the economic and political importance of deep seabed
mining to the United States and concludes by suggesting that
Congress provide further incentive for U.S. industry to proceed
with ocean mining.
INTRODUCTION
Over one hundred years ago, the British oceanographic ship
H.M.S. Challenger discovered mineral nodules on the ocean
seabed floor.' Nevertheless, nodules have only been considered a
valuable mineral source for the last fifteen years.2 In 1980 the
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (hereinafter the Deep
Seabed Act) established a licensing and regulatory scheme for
the exploration and commercial recovery of hard mineral re-
sources of the deep seabed by United States citizens.3 The timing
1. HR. REP. No. 96-411, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1979).
2. Id.
3. 30 U.S.CA § 1401 (West Supp. 1981). The Deep Seabed Act is designed to
be interim in nature. If and when the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea reaches an agreement on an international treaty, and such treaty comes
into force with respect to the United States, all deep seabed mining operations
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of the statute reflects the technological development of the United
States ocean mining industry. United States industry has com-
pleted the research and development stage of ocean mining and is
now prepared to develop technology for exploration and commer-
cial recovery of ocean nodules.4
In passing the Deep Seabed Act, Congress acknowledged the
need for ocean minerals5 and recognized that the development of
technology must proceed if deep seabed minerals are to be avail-
able when needed.6 Because United States industry has assumed
the role of developing seabed mineral technology, it is imperative
that U.S. industry proceed with these mining operations.
The assumption that U.S. industry will so proceed may be pre-
mature. Mining operations will require enormous amounts of
capital.7 To justify these expenditures, management must evalu-
ate the commercial and political risks involved in seabed mining
to determine whether an acceptable rate of return is possible.8
Although exploration for and commercial recovery of ocean
minerals are considered freedoms of the high seas,9 the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter
conducted by U.S. citizens will be conducted under the terms of that international
agreement. Id. § 1401(b) (3). Provisions of the Act not inconsistent with an inter-
national treaty shall continue in effect with respect to U.S. citizens. Id. § 1442.
4. Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 309 (1976).
5. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a) (1) (West Supp. 1981).
6. Id. § 1401(a) (11).
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Deep Seabed Mining: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography and the
House Comm on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 215 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Oceanography Hearings].
8. H.R. REP. No. 95-1125, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1978).
9. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (a) (12) (West Supp. 1981). This position has also been
asserted by the executive branch of the Government. A letter written to the
United States Senate by John N. Moore, State Department Counselor on Interna-
tional Law, reads: "The Executive Branch continues to hold the view that deep
seabed mineral exploitation constitutes a reasonable use of the high seas and is
presently permitted under international law. We have made this position clear to
other nations on many occasions." Deep Seabed Minerals: Hearings Before the
Senate Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 994
(1974). This view, however, is contested by the majority of the developing nations.
They consider any deep seabed mining under a municipal regime to be an interna-
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UNCLOS I) seeks to produce a treaty placing the seabed under
the control of an international organization beyond national juris-
diction.10 The uncertainty surrounding this regime has discour-
aged further investments by U.S. mining interests."
One of the most controversial issues related to the passage of
the Deep Seabed Act was whether to include some type of mecha-
nism to protect pre-treaty miners' investments from adverse ef-
fects of a forthcoming Law of the Sea treaty. 2 It was believed
that some type of government assurance would inspire further in-
vestments in technological development. 3 The protection cur-
rently offered by the Deep Seabed Act is inadequate. Because of
the importance of ocean mining to the United States, Congress
must provide further assurance to the U.S. ocean mining industry.
POITcAL BARRIERS TO CONTINUED INvESTMENT
IN SEABED MINING
United States industry has spent over fifteen years in the re-
search and development stage of ocean mining and has incurred
costs of close to 200 million dollars.14 The next stage of operations
involves the development of prototype equipment which must be
designed for a specific ocean site.'5 Industry has been reluctant
to proceed with this next stage because political developments
have created an unsatisfactory investment climate.' 6 This hesi-
tancy does not stem from a fear of violating any existing interna-
tionally illegal act. See Murphy, The Politics of Manganese Nodules: International
Considerations and Domestic Legislation, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 531, 538-41 (1979).
10. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), U.N. Doe. A/
CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as DCLOS].
11. H. REP. No. 96-411, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1979).
12. This protection was to be implemented in the form of an insurance pro-
gram. Supporters of this insurance protection point to the Overseas Private In-
vestment Corporations (OPIC) as precedent. This political risk insurance offered
by the Government has been established to encourage U.S. private investment in
friendly, less developed countries and covers losses due to inconvertibility of cur-
rency, expropriation, war, revolution, and insurrection. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(a) (1)
(1976). This statute, however, could not be extended to seabed mining because it
is limited to investment in an actual country. Id. § 2197(a).
13. Oceanography Hearings, supra note 7, at 56-57.
14. Deep Seabed Hard Minerals: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1979).
15. The design and process specifications will be predicated upon specific
mine site attributes such as topography of the ocean floor, depth, ocean currents,
weather conditions, and size and composition of the nodules. H.R. REP. No. 95-588
pt. 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977).
16. This next stage would consist of exploration and equipment development.
tional law, because the freedom to mine the deep seabed is
recognized under the 1958 Convention of the High Seas.'7 In-
stead, U.S. mining interests fear that new international law will
take effect after mining activities in the ocean are underway.
UNCLOS II is still in the negotiating stages after eight years of
conferences. Regulation of seabed exploitation has been one of
the most controversial issues in the UNCLOS I negotiations. 8
As the draft treaty now stands, United States industry could be
subject to substantial restrictions and controls that could impair
the value of investments made before a treaty enters into force.' 9
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that pre-treaty miners will be
able to retain any sites mined before the treaty becomes
effective.20
United States miners are ready to proceed with mining opera-
tions from a technological standpoint.21 Yet to proceed at this
time industry needs a precise definition of its future rights and
obligations. Without this, and without assurance that invest-
ments will not be significantly devalued, U.S. ocean mining will be
brought to a standstill. A review of specific proposals in the draft
treaty illustrates that fears of investment impairment are not
unfounded.
Commercial recovery is not authorized until January 1, 1988. 30 U.S.C.
§ 1412(c) (1) (D) (West Supp. 1981).
17. The authority for this freedom is derived from Article 2 which provides:
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by
these articles and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter
alia, both for coastal and non-coastal states:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.IA.S. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 (1962). Although the freedom to exploit the seabed is not expressly
mentioned, commentary to earlier versions of the article indicate that this does
not negate its existence.
The list of freedoms of the high seas contained in this article is not restric-
tive, the Commission has merely specified four of the main freedoms. It is
aware that there are other freedoms, such as freedom to explore or exploit
the subsoil of the high seas and freedom to engage in scientific research
therein.
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 10 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 1, U.N. Doc. A/2934 (1955), reprinted in (1955) 2 Y.B. Ir'NTL L.
CommI'N 19, 21, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1955/Add.1 (1960).
18. Of the three committees formed to decide issues at UNCLOS III one was
devoted solely to deep seabed mining.
19. These restrictions and controls amount to a defacto expropriation which
would effectively frustrate U.S. initiatives.
20. HI RE r. No. 95-1125, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978).
21. See note 4 .supra.
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Political Structure
A brief analysis of the proposed political structure in the draft
treaty demonstrates that the political system is not designed to
favor United States interests. 22 The international Sea-Bed Au-
thority, of which all States Parties will be members, will control
mining activities in the deep seabed.23 The primary governing
body of the Authority is to be the Assembly, an organization to be
comprised of all States Parties and managed on the basis of one
nation-one vote.2 4 The Group of 7725 would command more than a
three-fourths majority in this one nation-one vote system in
which a two-thirds majority prevails.26 Thus the industrialized
nations could have little influence over policies and decisions.
Even if all other seabed mining provisions of the draft treaty were
considered acceptable by United States standards, a political sys-
tem weighted heavily in favor of developing nations could quickly
change that outlook.
The Authority is granted the power to permit states and their
nationals to undertake ocean mining on a contractual basis.2 7 A
licensee may be granted the right to mine a specific ocean site in
consideration for agreeing to comply with certain specified terms
outlined in the treaty.28 Although the Authority is not permitted
to discriminate in the granting of a license, it can give special con-
sideration to developing States.2 9 The treaty also creates an En-
terprise which acts as the mining arm of the Authority. The
22. For a comprehensive review of the proposed international governing body,
see Comment, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act and the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Can the Conference Meet the Mandate
Embodied in the Act?, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 801 (1981).
23. DCLOS, supra note 10, Art. 156(2).
24. Id. Art 159(5).
25. The Group of 77 is a term which has come to embrace the majority of
Third World developing nations. Originally composed of 77 countries, the Group
now numbers 132 nations. Sea Treaty "Sabotage" 28 WoRLD PRESS REV. 53 (1981).
26. DCLOS, supra note 10, Art. 159(6). A two-thirds vote is needed on deci-
sions on questions of substance. Only a majority vote is needed on questions of
procedure. Id. Art. 159(7).
27. Id. Annex IlI, Art. 6(2).
28. Applicants must have the nationality or control and sponsorship of the
State Party of which the applicant is a national in addition to such qualification
standards as financial and technological capability. Id. Annex I, Art. 4.
29. Even this, however, is acceptable to industrial nations in view of earlier
drafts of the treaty. Earlier drafts gave the Authority complete discretion to reject
an applicant on even political grounds. Under the present draft, the approval of
mining rights is virtually automatic based on purely technical criteria.
Enterprise would be in direct competition with States and their
nationals.30
The Authority's other governing body is the Council, which is
responsible for determining specific policies conforming to As-
sembly decisions. 31 The thirty-six members of the Council are
chosen based upon geographical areas and special interests.32
While the industrialized nations have a much greater voice in de-
cisions in the Council than in the Assembly, the Council is
subordinate to the Assembly, which is the "supreme organ of the
Authority."33
Production Limitations
The draft treaty imposes limitations on the amount of minerals
that can be extracted from a specific minesite.34 It restricts pro-
duction to levels governed by the growth in the nickel market.35
This might prevent an adequate return on investment and could
result in the abandonment of a minesite.
The location of a minesite can also be restricted.36 A proposed
plan for a site may be denied if the licensee is already mining
under another plan in the same area and the aggregate size of
both sites would exceed specified limits. 37 This denial could in-
hibit siteholders from applying for licenses for newly-discovered
sites for fear that valuable sites would be turned over to another
nation.
Technology Transfer
The United States clearly has a technological lead over the de-
veloping nations.38 Yet these nations stand to reap the benefits of
30. DCLOS, supra note 10, Art. 170(1). This organ of the Authority will mine
the seabed, sell its products, and then turn its profits over to the Authority.
31. Id. Art. 162. The voting system of the Council has been a very difficult is-
sue to resolve. Decisions on questions of substance require either a two-thirds
majority, a three-fourths majority, or a consensus, depending upon the provision
on which the issue arose.
32. Id. Art. 161(1).
33. Id. Art. 160(1).
34. Id. Art. 151(2) (a). Nevertheless, the Authority is to reserve for production
by the Enterprise a specified amount from the available production ceiling. Id.
Art. 151(2) (c).
35. Id. This ceiling based on nickel consumption is considered by U.S. indus-
try to be both stringent and arbitrary.
36. DCLOS, supra note 10, Annex III, Art. 6(3) (c).
37. Id.
38. Development of the Hard Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1978). It is also estimated that the United
States has a five to seven year lead over Japan and the United Kingdom and ten to
fifteen year lead over Russia.
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United States research and development.3 9 Every applicant for a
minesite must agree to certain contractual provisions that require
a disclosure of technology.40 An applicant must make available to
the Enterprise at reasonable terms mining technology it plans to
use if such technology cannot be found on the open market by the
Enterprise.41 An applicant that refuses will not be permitted to
use the technology. The effect of these technology transfer pro-
visions is to make available the technologies of the industrialized
nations to the developing nations. The United States technologi-
cal lead would be neutralized and all nations would start on an
equal footing.43
Financial Requirements
In order to subsidize the mining operations of the Enterprise,
licensees are obligated to make certain payments to the Author-
ity.44 The administrative fee for processing an application is
$500,000 less any applicable refund. 45 Once a contract is made, a
contractor is subject to an annual assessment of the greater of
one million dollars or a production charge4 that could amount to
as much as seventy percent of the net proceeds from a mine.47
A contractor must submit at least two suitable mining areas in
applying for a minesite.48 Consequently, expenses for exploration
could be almost doubled. The Enterprise has first choice of the
two sites submitted.49 United States miners will have to delay
mining until the Enterprise has made the investigation necessary
to its informed choice.
The Enterprise is granted further preferential treatment. It is
39. Total United States investment in research and development is estimated
to be 250 million dollars.
40. DCLOS, supra note 10, Annex I, Art. 4(6) (d).
41. Id. Art. 5(3) (a). An applicant may use third-party technology only if that
third party will make it available to the Enterprise at reasonable terms if it cannot
be found on the open market. Id. Art. 5(3) (b).
42. DCLOS, supra note 10, Annex Il, Art. 5(3) (b).
43. The technology transfer provision in the treaty is considered to be
mandatory by the developing nations. Without it, the Enterprise would not be
able to develop technology in time to compete with the industrialized nations.
44. DCLOS, supra note 10, Annex HI, Art. 13.
45. Id. Art. 13(2).
46. Id. Art. 13(3).
47. The production charge is a function of the number of years in production
and the return on investment from a minesite. Id. Art 13(6) (c) (ii).
48. Id. Art. 8.
49. Id. Art. 9(1).
given interest-free capital and guaranteed loans to meet the costs
of its first minesite.50 The financial terms required of licensees do
not apply to the Enterprise and the Enterprise is permitted to ne-
gotiate for immunities from taxation.51
It is evident that there is a tangible threat to the economic in-
terests of ocean miners who proceed before a Law of the Sea
treaty is finalized. Not only is there no guarantee that a pre-
treaty minesite will be recognized, but there is also no guarantee
that any minesite can be maintained on an economically viable
basis once the treaty is in effect.
ECONOMIC AND POLriCAL NEED TO ENCOURAGE UNrrED STATES
MINING OF THE DEEP SEABED
Congress is well aware of the economic and strategic impor-
tance of seabed nodules to the United States. Nickel, copper, co-
balt, and manganese can be extracted from these nodules and are
of primary concern to the United States.52 The United States is
heavily dependent on other nations for three of these four metals,
which results in a balance of payments deficit.53 Congress recog-
nizes that demand for mineral sources will continue to exceed do-
mestic supply and that it is within the national interest to
decrease this dependency on other nations.54 In passing the Deep
Seabed Act, Congress thus acknowledges the need for an alterna-
tive source of supply.
50. Id. Annex IV, Art. 11(3) (d).
51. Id. Art. 13(5).
52. Copper's physical characteristics and relatively low cost make it particu-
larly attractive to U.S. industry for various uses. Nickel is used by U.S. industry
almost exclusively in alloys and is important in the manufacture of equipment
parts used in chemical and petroleum refining. Cobalt plays a very important role
in defense applications. It is a necessary ingredient in making heat-resistant al-
loys used in turbine blades for jet engines.
Of the metals that are anticipated to be produced from seabed nodules, manga-
nese is by far the most important to the United States. Virtually all of the manga-
nese is used to extract unwanted sulphur in the production of iron and steel
Manganese is considered to be an essential element of the steel industry as there
is no known substitute. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COBALT, COPPER, NICKEL, AND
MANGANESE: FUTuRs SUPPLY AND DEmAND Aim IMPLICATIONS FOR DEEP SEABED
MnNG (1979).
53. Id. The United States currently produces both copper and nickel domesti-
cally. There is no domestic production of cobalt and manganese, however, so the
United States must rely on imports to meet its demand. Most of this country's co-
balt comes from Zaire. It is significant that the world is dependent on Zaire for
approximately sixty percent of the noncommunist production of cobalt.
Present supplies of manganese are adequate, but it is predicted that by the end
of the century, South Africa and the USSR will account for the majority of land-
based production. This is not particularly encouraging to U.S. economists since
neither of these sources are considered reliable.
54. 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (West Supp. 1981).
[VOL. 19: 613, 1982] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
In the last decade, the United States has become aware of the
dangers inherent in depending on other nations for vital raw
materials. At the present time, land reserves of the four metals
found in seabed nodules are concentrated in very few foreign na-
tions.55 Five nations control virtually all of the free world's man-
ganese reserves; two nations control two-thirds of the free world's
nickel resources; and five nations control virtually all of the free
world's cobalt supplies.5 6 This, coupled with a lack of domestic
supply, increases vulnerability to both price fixing and
curtailment.57
Opinion is strongly divided as to whether the economic and
political conditions exist to sustain an effective price fixing cartel
in one of these metals. 58 Even if the opportunity for cartelization
does not presently exist, those nations that the United States de-
pends on for nickel, cobalt, and manganese have evidenced an in-
tent to form cartels.59 Article 5 of the "Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States", adopted by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly at the 29th session asserts, in effect, both a positive
right to form a commodity cartel and a duty not to resist the
objectives of such cartel.60 It is significant that of the nine coun-
55. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COBALT, COPPER, NIcKEL, AND MANGANESE: FU-
TURE SUPPLY AND DEMAND AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEEP SEABED MINING (1979).
56. Id.
57. Deep Seabed Mining: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 385
(1976).
58. The conditions that are usually considered important include: producer
control over a substantial share of world production; financial resources adequate
to cover loss of export earnings involved in restricting exports; inability of con-
sumers to develop alternative sources of supply; low price elasticity of demand;
absence of consumer stockpiles; limited possibilities of substitution; and political
objectives and economic situations that are similar among the producers. SCIENCE
PoucY RESEARCH, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND EcoNoMIcs Divi-
SIONs: DEEP SEABED MINERALS: RESOuRcEs, DIPLOMAcY, AND STRATEGIc INTEREST,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1978).
59. This only expresses a willingness to form a cartel One can only speculate
as to whether the conditions exist for these nations to form a cartel Many econo-
mists did not believe that the conditions existed for the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) to form a cartel
60. This section specifically provides:
All states have the right to associate in organizations of primary commod-
ity producers in order to develop their national economies, to achieve
stable financing for their development and, in pursuance of their aims, to
assist in the promotion of sustained growth of the world economy, in par-
ticular accelerating the development of the developing countries. Corre-
spondingly all states have the duty to respect that right by refraining from
applying economic and political measures that would limit it.
tries that export these three metals to the United States, none
joined the United States in voting against this resolution.61 One
Congressman has suggested that in view of this uncertainty, the
assumption of cartelization would be a rational and reasonable
basis on which to structure future resources policy of the United
States.62 Furthermore, even unsuccessful attempts to establish
cartel-like control over world mineral markets could have destabi-
lizing market impact and result in significant short-term economic
cost.63
Without seabed mining, the United States is vulnerable to eco-
nomic and political pressures from manganese, cobalt, and nickel
producing nations. The congressionally expressed interest in be-
coming self-sufficient in these metals cannot be realized through
domestic production alone.64 Currently, the United States im-
ports more than a billion dollars worth of these metals annually
and the import deficit is expected to grow to six or seven billion
dollars by the end of the century in the absence of deep seabed
mining.65 It is estimated, however, that if United States industry
promptly commences ocean mining, the United States could be-
come self-sufficient and would be in a position to export these
metals by the year 2000.66
ADEQUACY OF PROTECTION AGAINST AN ADVERSE LAW OF THE SEA
TREATY AND ITS PRACTICAL EFFECT ON UNITED
STATES INDUSTRY
Predecessor bills of the Deep Seabed Act reflected congres-
sional intent to encourage U.S. ocean mining by providing insur-
ance for U.S. investments.67 The bill originally included a blanket
government guarantee covering the entire amount of the invest-
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 31) 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
61. Id. The nine countries were Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, Gabon, Nor-
way, Peru, South Africa, and Zaire.
62. Development of the Hard Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1978) (statement of Rep. John M.
Murphy).
63. Mining of the Deep Seabed: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public
Lands and Resources and the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 490 (1977).
64. 30 U.S.CA. § 1401(a) (3) (West Supp. 1981).
65. Welling, Ocean Mining Systems, MINING CONGRESS JouNAI, Sept. 1976, at
145.
66. Id. at 144.
67. Legislation on deep seabed mining had been under consideration since the
92nd Congress. In the 93rd and 94th Congresses, bills were reported to the Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries but they did not reach the House. A
bill, I.L 3350, was reported to the 95th Congress and was passed by the House,
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ment at risk from losses resulting from the creation of an interna-
tional regime, as well as any loss caused by interference from
third persons.68 This guarantee evolved into a narrowly con-
structed insurance program. Before being deleted, the insurance
provision was limited to loss on equipment, facilities, and services
used for exploration, commercial recovery, and processing up to
the lesser of $350 million or ninety percent of the investment.6 9
Those insured would also be required to pay an annual premium
dependent on the total value of the investment.
The debate on these insurance provisions and their costs to the
United States resulted in Congress choosing a less costly alterna-
tive.7 0 In lieu of insurance protection, the Deep Seabed Act
passed by Congress included a grandfather clause. The clause ex-
presses the intent of Congress that any international agreement
should provide nondiscriminatory access to the deep seabed and
should provide security of tenure for pretreaty miners.71 It is nor-
mal practice in this country to include a provision for grandfather
rights for existing operators when making radical changes in the
laws governing commercial activities.72 This helps maintain in-
312 to 80, but was not acted upon by the Senate. H.I& REP. No. 96-411, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 30 (1979).
68. S.2801, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); HR. 13904, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
69. H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
70. It was believed that the United States could be subject to a claim close to
two billion dollars from U.S. miners if investments were vitiated by UNCLOS II.
Id.
71. 30 U.S.CA. § 1441 (West Supp. 1981) states:
It is the intent of Congress-
(1) that any international agreement to which the United States be-
comes a party should, in addition to promoting other national oceans
objectives-
(A) provide assured and nondiscriminatory access, under reason-
able terms and conditions, to the hard mineral resources of the
deep seabed for United States citizens, and
(B) provide security of tenure by recognizing the rights of United
States citizens who have undertaken exploration or commercial
recovery under subchapter I of this chapter before such agree-
ment enters into force with respect to the United States to con-
tinue their operations under terms, conditions, and restrictions
which do not impose significant new economic burdens upon
such citizens with respect to such operations with the effect of
preventing the continuation of such operations on a viable eco-
nomic basis.
72. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act- Hearings and Markup Before
the House Comm. on International Organizations and on International Economic
Policy and Trade, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Interna-
tional Hearings ].
vestment stability and avoids confrontation with the constitu-
tional obligations to compensate persons whose property has
been taken by government action.73 The protection offered by the
grandfather provision in the Deep Seabed Act, however, is Mu-
sory in that the Act does not confer any rights to United States
miners but merely expresses an intent to secure rights for them
in the future Law of the Sea treaty.74 It is, in essence, a promise
to secure a grandfather clause. From the wording of the statute, a
Congressional mandate to the United States negotiators at UN-
CLOS H cannot be inferred.75 Furthermore, grandfather rights
for United States miners should naturally be part of the United
States negotiating position even in the absence of the grandfather
provision of the Act.
A grandfather clause in the Law of the Sea treaty would elimi-
nate the need for Congress to protect United States investments.
Yet Congress cannot guarantee to investors that the United
States will only ratify a treaty that contains grandfather rights.76
It may be impossible for United States negotiators to obtain an
ocean mining grandfather clause in a treaty that must be agreed
upon by 150 countries. When the Senate votes on a treaty, its de-
cision will be influenced not only by the treaty's provisions on the
deep seabed, but also by its effect on other national interests.77
Thus it is conceivable that the United States may ratify a treaty
that does not contain grandfather ocean mining provisions. 78
In an effort to implement congressional intent, the United
States submitted an informal working paper to the conference at
the 1980 UNCLOS I spring session. The working paper included
a treaty provision and language to be inserted into the conference
73. Id. at 65.
74. Congress was very careful not to imply any rights to a possible claim by
United States miners. They further vindicated their potential liability by disclaim-
ing "any legal or moral obligation on the part of the United States Government to
compensate any person for any impairment of the value of that person's invest-
merit.. .which might occur in connection with that entering into force of an inter-
national agreement ... ." 30 U.S.C. § 1444 (West Supp. 1981).
75. One argument against the inclusion of an insurance provision in the Deep
Seabed Act deals with its effect on U.S. negotiators at UNCLOS 13L United States
negotiators may be hampered if they know that agreement to any provisions
which might occasion a loss of investment by United States citizens could require
substantial payments by the Treasury. If the grandfather provision were con-
strued as a mandate, this would not only hamper United States negotiators, but it
would virtually handcuff them.
76. International Hearings, supra note 72, at 65.
77. Other interests involve freedom of navigation and overflight, utilization
and conservation of coastal resources, protection of the marine environment, sta-
bility and uniformity in the conduct of marine scientific research, and broad avail-
ability and use of mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
78. International Hearings, supra note 72, at 65.
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resolution.7 9 This provision suggests an approach to interim pro-
tection of investment by granting a pre-treaty investor priority to
a specific site in the event a subsequent applicant requests all or
part of the site.80 At the resumed spring session of UNCLOS III,
the Group of 77 expressed concern that these proposed provisions
would move private mining activities even further ahead of the
Enterprise than they were already.8 1 The USSR also indicated
that under this investment protection arrangement early appli-
cants could secure prime sites to the disadvantage of later en-
trants.8 2 These reactions indicate that the inclusion of a
grandfather clause in the Law of the Sea treaty is far from
assured.
Present Status of U.S. Ocean Mining
Without any type of assurance against the adverse impact of a
Law of the Sea treaty on economic interests, it is uncertain what
effect the Deep Seabed Act will have upon United States indus-
try's decision to further invest in ocean floor mining. The Act,
which in its earlier draft form was designed to give some assur-
ance to the United States ocean mining industry, now has virtu-
ally deprived United States industry of any international right to
mine the ocean. Prior to the enactment of the statute, United
States miners were free to mine the ocean floor under interna-
tional law.8 3 With the passage of the Act, United States miners
are now governed by a stringent regulatory framework and are ac-
tually prohibited from mining the ocean unless certain criteria are
satisfied.8 4 The Act thus serves to retract a prior international
right by imposing mandatory restrictions and controls. United
79. Discussions with both representatives of the ocean mining industry and
the Group of 77 on this proposal began as far back as November, 1979. United
States Delegation Report, Ninth Session of the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, New York, February 27-April 4, 1980, at 43.
80. Id. at 44-48.
81. United States Delegation Report, Resumed Ninth Session of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, July 28-August 29, 1980,
at 43.
82. Id.
83. See note 17 supra.
84. An applicant must demonstrate that he will be financially able to meet all
obligations that may be required to engage in exploration or commercial recovery,
that he will have the technological capability to engage in such exploration or
commercial recovery, and that the proposed plan meets the requirements of the
chapter. 30 U.S.C.A § 1413(c) (West Supp. 1981).
States industry must now take into consideration the obligations
imposed under the Act in addition to those that will be imposed
by the future Law of the Sea treaty.85
United States industry could proceed in the hope that United
States negotiators at UNCLOS DI will be able to secure grandfa-
ther rights for pre-treaty miners. Yet it would be difficult to jus-
tify expenditures to corporate shareholders while there is a
significant risk that a treaty will subsequently enter into force
containing terms that will vitiate that investment.86
The availability of financing is a critical factor in deciding
whether to proceed with mining. Financial institutions are reluc-
tant to finance United States mining companies so long as the in-
vestment's security is subject to uncertainties related to the
venture's legal status. 87 Banks are not willing to assume the polit-
ical risk that government authorities will materially affect the pro-
ject's cash flow and ability to service debt.88 Even the recruiting
of financial backers for land-based mining projects is not an easy
task.89 Land-based miners can at least point to unfettered title to
the minerals to be mined and to the technological certainty that
comes from participation in an established venture.90 The ocean
mining industry, in contrast, is entering into a totally new indus-
try and a new physical environment.91 It is unlikely that banks
would consider a promise of U.S. negotiators to attempt to obtain
grandfather rights for United States industry as satisfactory as-
surance against political risks.
Private insurance companies are willing to offer the ocean min-
ing industry limited insurance for such political acts as terrorism,
sabotage, and seizure.92 Yet the private sector is unwilling to of-
fer protection from the possible loss of investment caused by an
international treaty which negates or diminishes the possibility of
productive ocean mining.93 Government participation in sharing
some of the political risk is an essential precondition to participa-
tion by the private sector.94
85. Those provisions inconsistent with the treaty will no longer be in effect. 30
U.S.C.A § 1442 (West Supp. 1981).
86. Oceanography Hearings, supra note 7, at 54.
87. Id. at 172 (statement of C. Thomas Houseman).
88. Id.
89. Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Act- Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Arms Contro4 Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Comm on For-
eign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 222 (1978).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. H.R. REP. No. 95-588 pt. 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977).
93. Oceanography Hearings, supra note 7, at 370-96.
94. International Hearings, supra note 72, at 50.
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United States industry has considered abandoning ocean min-
ing.95 If this were to occur, the United States could lose the bene-
fits of a new secure source of mineral supplies free from the
control of other countries.9 6 Further, United States industry's
technological position would fall far behind that of other industri-
alized nations. United States miners have already entered into
consortia with foreign companies to spread the risks of early in-
vestments for which borrowing was not available.9 7 In exchange
for foreign companies' agreement to share the risk, United States
industry has agreed to work jointly with these nations in the de-
velopment of technology.9 8 Consortium agreements already pro-
vide for some automatic technology transfer in the event that the
United States company is unable to continue with the project.99
Some companies of other nations are state-owned or state-subsi-
dized.100 If the United States abandons plans to mine the ocean,
these foreign companies might be in a position to take the polit-
ical risk of mining before a treaty enters into effect.
United States industry could also wait until a treaty is finally
passed. Legal and economic obligations could then be deter-
mined before making the decision to proceed with mining activi-
ties. It is uncertain, however, when and if a Law of the Sea treaty
will be ratified. Recent developments suggest that a final agree-
ment is not as near as had been anticipated.Ol The Reagan ad-
ministration has expressed an intent to delay UNCLOS I
95. In correspondence to Rep. Elliot I Richardson, Marne Dubs, representa-
tive for the American Mining Congress, warned-
If the present negotiating text is not substantially changed.. .and it in-
stead enters into force in anything like its present form, there will be no
U.S. ocean mining industry.
In fact, as you know, prospects for the continued existence of any viable
U.S. ocean mining industry hinge on prompt enactment of domestic legis-
lation coupled with major amendments to the treaty text including the ad-
dition of an explicit grandfather provision which fully protects all U.S.
mining activities conducted pursuant to the legislation.
The Status of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1980).
96. See text accompanying notes 52-66 supra.
97. For a detailed listing of existing consortia, see U.N. OCEAN EcoNoMacs AND
TEcnNOLOGY OrICE, FACTS ON DEEPSEA MINING CONSORTIA, reprinted in Deep
Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Economic Policy and Trade and on International Organizations of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 256-57 (1980).
98. Oceanography Hearings, supra note 7, at 70.
99. Id.
100. International Hearings, supra note 72, at 107.
101. See 18 U.N. CHRONICLE 12-13 (1981).
negotiations for the purpose of re-examining the proposed Law of
the Sea treaty, specifically the deep seabed issues. 0 2 This may
indicate that the Reagan administration will strive for a Law of
the Sea treaty that will afford more protection for United States
interests.103 The inevitable result would be further delay in treaty
agreement. 0 4
In addition to the delay anticipated before an agreement is
reached on a final treaty, the period for ratification needs to be
considered in determining when legal rights of the miners would
finally be defined. The history of other conventions demonstrates
that long periods of time have elapsed before the requisite
number of States ratified to bring the treaty into effect.105
As another alternative, U.S. industry could mine under the
sponsorship of one of the developing countries or one of the other
industrialized nations, particularly one of the nations already a
party to the consortia. Currently, one other nation, the Federal
Republic of Germany, has passed interim seabed legislation and
several others are considering it.106 Although West Germany's
legislation was patterned after that of the United States, it is dis-
similar in two significant respects that could make mining under a
foreign flag more appealing. 07 The legislation of both countries
has provisions dealing with the protection of the environment, but
the requirements of the Deep Seabed Act are more stringent and
could impose a more significant economic burden.108 United
States miners are required to use the "best available technolo-
gies" for the protection of the environment except when it is not
102. Dragging on Law of the Sea, Washington Star, Mar. 8, 1981.
103. Id.
104. There are indications that although the conference is prepared to give the
new administration time to review the draft treaty, they are determined to com-
plete the convention in the near future. 18 U.N. Cm~oncr.E 13 (1981).
105.
Years
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 6
Convention on the High Seas 4
Convention on the Continental Shelf 6
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources 8
of the High Seas
It should be recognized that these treaties were not as controversial as is the one
presently being negotiated. Development of the Hard Mineral Resources of the
Deep Seabed; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (1978).
106. BGB1, Pt. I, 9080, No. 50 (August 22, 1980), at 1429, reprinted in 19 IvrERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL MATERL s 1330 (1980).
107. Only one consortium, Ocean Management, Inc., involves participation of
both a United States company and a West German company. See note 97 supra.
108. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 1419 (West Supp. 1981) with BGB1, Pt. I, 9080, No.
50 (August 22, 1980) § 5.
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cost justified. 0 9
The second major difference deals with vessel documentation.
Mining under United States law requires that all vessels used for
commercial recovery and at least one vessel used for mineral
transportation be documented under United States law." 0 Addi-
tionally, the processing of the minerals must be conducted within
the United States unless there is assurance that if they are
processed abroad, the minerals will be returned to the United
States for domestic use if so required."' This poses possible eco-
nomic burdens that would not exist if mining under West German
law. 12
CONCLUSION
Failure of the Deep Seabed Act to protect against adverse ef-
fects of a Law of the Sea treaty has created a dilemma for the
United States ocean mining industry. Since precatory grandfa-
ther language in the statute does not give assurance to financial
supporters, it is uncertain whether exploration and development
of equipment will continue at this time. Mining now under the
sponsorship of another country is another possibility, but is diffi-
cult because of the Deep Seabed Act's jurisdiction over a broadly
defined "U.S. citizen."" 3
United States industry is in a position where it may abandon
ocean mining or postpone it until a Law of the Sea treaty has
been agreed upon and finally ratified. Either choice results in a
delay of the political and economic benefits this nation could gain
from deep seabed mining.
Congress is well aware of the national importance of seabed
109. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1419(b) (West Supp. 1981).
110. Id. § 1412(c)(2)-(3).
111. Id. § 1412(c) (5).
112. West German legislation contains no provisions dealing with ship docu-
mentation or processing sites.
113. "U.S. citizen" is defined so as to encompass, inter alia, "any corpora-
tion.. .(whether organized or existing under the laws of any of the United States
or a foreign nation) if the controlling interest in such entity.. 1' is held by an indi-
vidual who is a citizen of the United States or a corporation or other entity organ-
ized and existing under the laws of the United States. 30 U.S.C-.A § 1403(14)
(West Supp. 1981). "Controlling interest" is defined broadly to cover an interest in
or influence over another person arising through "ownership of capital stock, inter-
locking directorates or officers, contractual relations, or other similar means,
which substantially affect the independent business behavior of such person." Id.§ 1403(3).
mining.114 It considered incentives for United States industry to
mine the ocean but finally chose the less costly alternative of only
showing general negotiating support for the ocean mining indus-
try.115 Although cheaper in the short-run, it may ultimately prove
to be a very expensive decision. Grandfather rights for ocean
miners in the Law of the Sea treaty are not presently forseeable,
and private sector United States ocean mining may not proceed
without them.116 The future of United States ocean mining still
remains in the hands of Congress. Now is the time for Congress
by new legislation to provide the necessary impetus for the do-
mestic ocean mining effort to continue. Private sector insurance
companies have expressed a willingness to insure United States
ocean miners' investments against an adverse treaty if there is
some type of government participation in sharing the risk. It is
recommended that Congress explore a type of insurance program
in which the government would offer insurance protection in con-
junction with private insurance companies. Once the considera-
tions are balanced, the benefits to be gained by this legislation
will certainly outweigh the costs to be incurred.
ROGER A. GEDDES
114. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
115. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West Supp. 1981).
116. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
